The Analysis of ‘Leading Sectors’: A Long term view of 18 Latin American economies by Acevedo, Alejandra et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Analysis of ‘Leading Sectors’: A
Long term view of 18 Latin American
economies
Alejandra Acevedo and Andrew Mold and Esteban Perez
Caldentey
June 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15017/
MPRA Paper No. 15017, posted 5. May 2009 23:55 UTC
  
 
 
The Analysis of ‘Leading Sectors’:   
A Long term view of 18 Latin American economies 
 
 
April 2009 
 
 
Alejandra Acevedo,a/ Andrew Mold b/ and Esteban Pérez Caldenteya/ 1 
 
                                                 
1
 a/ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, Chile); b/ Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD, France). This paper has been reproduced without formal editing. The opinions here expressed 
are the authors’ own and may not coincide with those of ECLAC and/or OECD. 
Acevedo, Mold and Perez 
 2
 
 
 
Abstract 
In the 1950s and 60s, in Latin America structuralism was considered as the preeminent form of 
analysis of economic development and growth. Nowadays, in contrast, as a mode of analysis 
structuralism is distinctly unfashionable, and has been superceded by newer endogenous growth 
theories, which build on earlier neoclassical contributions. Beyond broad endorsements of 
enhancing human capital, promoting infrastructure provision and the importance of sustaining 
investment levels, it is arguable whether endogenous growth theories been able to shed much light 
on the dynamics of growth. This paper revindicates the utility of structuralist analysis in the 
analysis of Latin American growth patterns. Through some simple empirical tests, it explores the 
relationship between economic growth and structural performance. Using as high a level of 
disaggregation as the data allows, we use dynamic panel data analysis together with a steady state 
model to calculate the elasticities of sectoral growth to overall output. The implications for 
resource allocation and policies to promote particular sectors are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditionally, one of the enduring concerns of Latin American economists has been the low level 
of industrial development and an overdependence on the export of primary materials (see, inter 
alia, Singer and Prebisch 1953; Ocampo and Parra, 2003). This concern is based on a fundamental 
belief that a developed economy is an industrialized economy (Kregel, 2007). Indeed, during the 
fifties and sixties manufacturing was very much the “fair-haired child of most third-world 
governments” (Reynolds, 1983:93) In the last two decades, however, the issue has taken a 
backseat in discussions of development strategy, as economic policymakers have focused on 
problems related to liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization. Purposely promoting industrial 
development has been much frowned upon during the last two decades. Anne Krueger (2007) has 
been one of the most outspoken critics of such policies:  
  
“Focusing on industrialization as a policy objective is almost certainly wrong. 
Mechanization and increasing productivity in all sectors usually leads to more rapid 
growth in industry than of other sectors, but that is the outcome of appropriate policy. 
While it highly likely that growth of agricultural productivity – a necessary part of overall 
economic growth – will shift returns to induce movement of workers to industrial (and 
service) activities, a focus on industrialization as an instrument, rather than an outcome, 
can lead to low growth if not stagnation”  
 
In contrast, other authors (e.g. Hausman and Rodrik, 2003:697) argue that a ‘laissez faire’ attitude 
is hardly likely to achieve the desired consequences in terms of structural diversification and 
technological dynamism of the economy, and that the identification of ‘leading sectors’ is still 
incumbent upon on the government:  
 
“Laissez-faire leads to under-provision of innovation and governments need to play a dual 
role in fostering industrial growth and transformation. They need to encourage 
entrepreneurship and investment in new activities ex ante, but push out unproductive firms 
and sectors ex post. This is of course easier said than done. The specifics of how this can 
be managed is likely to differ considerably from country to country, depending on 
administrative capability, the prevailing incentive regime, the flexibility of the fiscal 
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system, the degree of sophistication of the financial sector, and the underlying political 
economy.”  
 
As a point of departure, this paper takes an agnostic view on these debates, and is not intended to 
be proscriptive in its arguments. By empirical analysis of the data, we try to determine which have 
been the sectors which have most contributed to the dynamism of the Latin American economies 
over the long run. In common with previous studies (e.g. Wells and Thirlwall (2003), who test the 
applicability of Kaldor’s growth laws for African countries, and also Libanio (2006), who carries 
out his analysis on a group of Latin American countries),  the paper revindicates the importance of 
the manufacturing sector for economic development in the region. But we also find a more 
nuanced conclusion. In particular, we study in some depth whether other potential ‘engines of 
growth’ exist outside the manufacturing sector and find that, with the rise of the so-called ‘new 
economy’, certain groups of service sectors can also serve as catalysts for faster growth.  
Following Palma (2005), these results are put in perspective of the debates on 
‘deindustrialization’, and it is argued that Latin America has suffered from policy-induced 
deindustrialisation rather than from a natural shift towards services and other sectors. The causes 
and implications of this process for development strategy are discussed. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of both theoretical 
and empirical views of structural change in the region. Section 3, which presents our own 
empirical results, is sub-divided into different parts. Results into the analysis of ‘leading sectors’ 
are compared between different methodologies, in part A using static panel estimates of Kaldorian 
sectoral growth elasticities, in part B a dynamic panel data analysis and a steady-state model. 
Given the results in previous parts, which suggest a strong relation between service sector and 
overall growth, in part C we analyse the services sector in more detail. In part D some simple tests 
of causality are utilized. Finally, in Section 4 conclusions are drawn and some observations for 
policymakers are made.      
 
Empirical Regularities in Economic Growth:  A Long term view of 18 Latin American economies  
 5
2. Theoretical and empirical views on Structural Change in Latin America  
 
Early development economists addressed the problem of industrialization through different 
strategies aimed to catalyse broader development. These ranged from the big push ideas put 
forward by Rosenstein-Rodan (1957) and the balanced-unbalanced growth controversy that 
followed, to the dual sector Lewis model (1954) and Kaldor’s growth laws (1966). Whatever their 
differences, these views shared some fundamental insights into the development process. 
Development and its synonym industrialization were not, and indeed according to these theorists 
could not be, conceived in static terms as in Ricardian theory. This meant dispensing with the 
concept of full employment which is at the basis of optimal resource allocation theory. This 
approach also led to the introduction, early on, of the notion of increasing returns to scale. 
Increasing returns to scale are at the core of Rosenstein-Rodan big push as well as Lewis and 
Kaldor’s views. The notion of increasing returns to scale provided the foundations for the study of 
structural change. 
 
The dynamics of economic development necessarily involved the analysis of the interaction 
between economic sectors.2 Historically, at the time when these early development views were put 
forward the interaction analysis was mainly carried out in terms of dual sector analysis involving 
agriculture and industry (manufacturing). The relations between sectors were conceived in fairly 
simple terms. In the most known approach industry (manufacturing) would absorb the surplus 
labour emanating from agriculture allowing the sector to increase its productivity and standard of 
living. The improvement in agricultural conditions would allow the sector to generate a demand 
for manufacturing products, thereby creating the conditions for sustained growth and development. 
 
The analysis even when framed in its most modern guise (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1989) had some fundamental implications for economic development. Industrialization resulted 
from the coordination of investment plans and decisions across sectors; complementarities 
between sectors worked through market size effects; the whole process of development and 
industrialization required a certain degree of government intervention. 
                                                 
2
 A general plea for "structuralist" analysis of Latin America economic problems is to be found in Osvaldo Sunkel, "El trasfondo 
estructural de 1os problemas del desarrollo latinoamericano," Trimestre Economico, XXXIV (Jan.-Mar. 1967), 11 58. For an 
interpretation of structuralism as a strategy for problem-solving, see Albert Hirschman, “Journeys Toward Progress” (New York: 
Twentieth Century Fund, 1963) pp. 210-16 and 231.45. 
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 In the last two decades, the industrialization-manufacturing debate has taken a backseat in 
discussions of development strategy, as economic policymakers have focused on problems related 
to liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization under the guidance of the Washington 
Consensus. Nonetheless, the recent development of Latin American economies marked by the 
prioritization of commodities as the only way to bring these economies out of their current level of 
stagnation have brought back the industrialization and structural change debate to the forefront.  
 
In this context, the 1980’s debt crisis marked a break point in the long term growth trajectory of 
Latin American economies. The decomposition of the GDP per capita clearly shows a decline in 
the long term trend (Figure 1) (though with a marked recovery since 2003).  
Figure 1: Latin America 1961-2006. Actual rate of growth and its trend component 
(Hodrick-Prescott Filter Method). 
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Source: On the basis of World Development Indicators (2008). World Bank. 
 
Latin American countries addressed the debt crisis by a dramatic shift in their economic policies, 
away from the previous policies of state led intervention and towards a more liberal model, based 
on the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2003; Bulmer Thomas, 2003). Despite the fact that 
between 1963 and 1980 there was a long period of sustained economic growth in the region,   and 
quite notable structural change occurred towards manufactures (though the same was not true of 
exports), conventional wisdom deemed these policies unsustainable and, under the tutelage of 
Formatted: Left
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organizations like the World Bank and the IMF, practically the whole continent shifted towards 
more liberal policies.  
 
The switch of policies did not deliver the kind of economic performance that their proponents 
anticipated.3 For one thing, the policies never delivered outside the reduction in the inflation rates, 
better economic performance. Growth rates turned out to be much lower during the market 
liberalization experience, and Latin American countries were never able to improve their 
competitive potential. They learned to export but also became more apt at importing, leaving the 
region still highly dependent on external finance for its balance of payments, a situation that was 
only to change with the commodity price boom which started in 2003. More pointedly, 
notwithstanding progress in certain areas, some important structural characteristics of the Latin 
American economies barely changed over the whole period of reforms. Strikingly, the amount of 
manufacturing value added per capita has remained almost constant over the last 25 years. Indeed, 
according to UNIDO figures, it is actually below the figure achieved at the end of the 1980s (Table 
1). China, over the same period, managed to multiply by a factor of six its manufacturing 
production per capita.4    
Table 1: Per-capita MVA in constant (1995) US $ 
Country group 1981 1986 1991 1991 1995 2000 2005 
        
Developed market economies 4153 4444 4942 4942 5086 5699 5949 
Transition economies 655 721 723 723 450 540 814 
Developing regions:       
 Sub-Saharan Africa 32 32 31 31 28 29 30 
 North Africa 128 152 156 156 159 185 197 
 Latin America and Caribbean 807 701 669 669 687 731 769 
 South and East Asia 92 113 164 164 214 260 329 
 China** 90 125 169 169 263 380 559 
 West Asia and Europe 416 472 485 485 514 590 706 
Source: http://www.unido.org/data/UNIDO/Stats/Staworld2.cfm?c=GHA 
 
                                                 
3
 There is one important caveat here that must be borne in mind. Between 2003-7 economic growth in per capita has recovered, and 
has in fact been the strongest seen the decade of the 1960s (ELCAC, 2007). Nevertheless, it is arguable whether this corresponds 
to a belated payoff from the NEM, or is better attributed to a rise in commodity prices.    
4
 As UNIDO (2006:150) show, MVA is a good proxy for a number of other important indicators of development, being highly 
correlated both with the share of manufactured exports and technologically-more advanced production.    
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As a consequence of this apparent inability to raise manufacturing per capita, the share of 
manufacturing in GDP has actually fallen since the early 1990s, as reflected in Table 2. In some 
countries, the scale of this deindustrialisation has really been quite pronounced. The explanation in 
some cases is obviously related to the boom in oil production or commodity production (countries 
like Ecuador, Venezuela or Bolivia), but there has also been a quite clear trend towards 
deindustrialisation in countries like Uruguay, Jamaica and Panama, as well as a significant 
increase in the participation of services, like in the case of Argentina (from 44 to 66 percent), 
Mexico (56 to 64 percent), and Peru (32 to 52 percent). The share of manufacturing in GDP has 
also declined in larger countries of the region like Brazil, Colombia and Mexico.   
 
Table 2: Manufacturing Sector as a Share of GDP, 1990-2004  
 1990 2004 Change 
Argentina  23.9 22.3 -1.7 
Bolivia  17.0 12.4 -4.6 
Brazil  22.8 21.5 -1.3 
Chile  17.0 17.0 0.0 
Colombia  18.0 14.4 -3.6 
Costa Rica  20.4 19.6 -0.8 
Ecuador  19.4 4.7 -14.7 
El Salvador  21.7 22.0 0.3 
Honduras  14.5 18.0 3.5 
Jamaica  18.6 12.5 -6.0 
México  19.0 16.3 -2.7 
Panama  12.9 7.2 -5.6 
Paraguay  17.1 14.2 -2.9 
Peru  18.2 14.9 -3.3 
Dominican Republic  26.4 24.1 -2.3 
Uruguay  28.0 21.3 -6.6 
Venezuela  27.2 17.1 -10.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean a/ 21.2 17.8 -3.4 
Latin America a/ 21.4 18.0 -3.4 
Caribbean  9.7 7.8 -1.9 
Source : ECLAC database 
 
This story is all the more surprising because of a few notable cases of success in promoting 
manufacturing exports in the region in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Central America and the 
Dominican Republic and Mexico (Agosin, 2006). In both the cases of Central American countries 
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and Mexico there has been a sharp shift in the composition of exports, from an extremely high 
dependence on agriculture and natural resources (oil) towards a highly diversified export structure. 
Currently, in the cases of Central American countries and Mexico (El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Mexico) more than 70 percent of exports are manufactures (table 3).  
 
Table 3 
Central America: Main Export Products as a Percentage of the Total, 1990 – 2005 
Countries Products Years       
  
    1990 1993 1996 1999 2005 
Machinery 4.6 5.7 8.1 43.9 38 
Fruits and nuts 22.8 22.4 20 13 15 
Textiles and apparel 37.4 41.2 35.5 20.8 8 
Costa Rica  
Subtotal 64.8 69.3 63.6 77.7 61 
Textiles and apparel 22.8 51.5 67.2 82.8 81 
Coffee and tea 36.1 20.2 4.9 4.2 2 
Electrical machinery 10.3 6.5 3.1 1.9 1 
Fish and mollusks 5.2 4.3 3.7 1.7 0.5 
El Salvador  
Subtotal 74.4 82.5 78.9 90.6 84.5 
Textiles and apparel 24 45.8 47.7 54.9 84.5 
Coffee 23.7 12.9 15.6 13.4 9.2 
Fruits and nuts 15.3 11.6 10.8 8.6 12.2 
Fossil fuels 2.9 2 3.6 4.2 4.5 
Guatemala  
Subtotal 65.9 72.3 77.7 81.1 84 
Textiles and apparel 22.9 55.6 69 80.9 71.2 
Fish and mollusks 12.6 9.9 5.7 4 4.1 
Fruits and nuts 12 14.6 10.9 1.9 4.3 
Coffee and tea 9.5 3.2 2.2 1.9 1.7 
Honduras  
Subtotal 57 83.3 87.8 88.7 81.3 
Textiles and apparel 26.8 48.5 54.9 59.9 54.0 
Fish and mollusks 8.9 7.1 4.7 2.9 7.0 
Fruits and nuts 12.7 11.3 10.3 7.2 10.2 
Average 
Coffee and tea 23.1 12.1 7.6 6.5 5.7 
Source: Module to Analyse the Growth of International Commerce (MAGIC, 2001); Markus 
Rodlauer and Alfred Schipke, eds. Central America: Global Integration and Regional 
Cooperation. IMF Occasional Paper 243. July 2005. 
 
Yet at the same time, manufacturing value added as a share of GDP over the same period has 
actually contracted or stagnated, and the overall growth performance has been poor. Why such a 
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dichotomous performance should occur is open to dispute, but might be associated with a slow 
‘maquilizacion’ of these economies, whereby domestic industry is ‘hollowed out’ by a raising 
share of imported intermediates (and a concomitant increase in the import elasticity of income) 
and a subsequent collapse of the export multiplier.5  
 
Even in the case of Chile, successful export and growth performance since the mid-1980s has been 
accompanied by only weak structural change and diversification towards non-traditional exports. 
For Chile, traditional products represented in 1995 and 2005, 63% of the total. This raises the 
question of whether such phenomena are naturally-induced shifts towards the tertiary sector, or the 
result of policy failures. Commenting on the Chilean case, Mesquista Moreira (2007) argues that: 
 
“Chile of the nineties is a “domestic” natural-resource success. Yet, Chile’s success 
(which, by the way, still has close to 40 percent of its exports linked to one single 
product—copper) is dwarfed by the growth, diversification and technological 
sophistication of the “manufacturing” East Asia and is matched by Venezuela’s failure, 
which bears clear symptoms of Dutch Disease...Trade liberalization and the hands-off 
policy that prevailed throughout the nineties led these economies to a regime as close to a 
“neutral” system of incentives as it has ever been. The “don’t-turn-your-back” kind of 
advice does not seem to have, then, any practical consequence.”  
 
Does this lack of diversification matter? At one level, the answer must be a resounding ‘yes’ - all 
highly specialised countries are poor, while all developed countries are highly diversified, both in 
their export and production structures. There are some important theoretical reasons why greater 
diversification of export structure might lead to faster growth, including a decrease in volatility of 
export income, which might lead to more stable macroeconomic environment and faster growth 
(Agosin, 2006). In fact, in the 1960s and 70s under policies of import substitution a number of 
Latin American countries did achieve significant structural change in their domestic economies 
(Brazil, Mexico and Argentina being two notable examples), but their export structures remained 
                                                 
5
 Export multipliers collapsed in part because of the way in which the maquila industry evolved separately from the rest of the 
economy. But the positive impact of exports was also reduced as Mexican firms were forced to compete with US firms by 
copying their sourcing practices and importing an increasing share of their total imports from abroad. Hence the irony that, in 
spite of a massive increase of total exports, the balance of payments remained in deficit. For more details, see Mold and Rozo, 
2006, Palma, 2005). 
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to a large extent dependent on commodities. There is a general consensus in the literature that 
overvalued exchange rates (part and package of the import substitution policies, at least as they 
were applied in Latin America) contributed to this outcome (Bulmer Thomas, 2003, Rodrik, 
2007). But subsequent policies from the mid-1980s onwards under the so-called New Economic 
Model (NEM) did little better in promoting structural change. With the overriding emphasis on 
controlling inflation, in many countries of the region tight monetary polices (sometimes including 
very damaging pegs of the currency) paradoxically led to a continuation of an overvaluation of the 
currency, with particularly damaging consequences for the perspectives of export diversification 
and manufacturing employment.6  
 
The practical repercussions of these sectoral shifts have been much debated. According to other 
analysts, the lack of structural diversification and the observed trends towards deindustrialisation 
in the region are nothing to be concerned about: they simply reflect a world-wide shift towards the 
service sector, something which is also evident in the industrialised countries. In the United States, 
for example, the service sector now accounts for around 70 per cent of the economy, yet this 
development apparently worries few people. To borrow Krugman’s phrase, the economy is 
becoming increasingly ‘light’. In the case of Latin America, the share of services rose on average 
from 49% to 56% between 1970-1979 and 1991-2001 (Table 4). In employment terms, the impact 
is generally considered to have been negative - manufacturing firms have a greater employment-
generating potential than the service sector, not only through the direct employment deriving from 
the initial investment, but also through the “feedback” into the rest of the economy via forward 
and, especially, backward linkages.7 Given their contribution to the exportable sector, a lack of 
dynamism in manufacturing can also have a negative impact on the trade balance, with countries 
displaying a weak manufacturing sector often also reporting poor balance of payments results.8 
Services, on the other hand, are only partially tradable, and may not be able to offset the fall in 
                                                 
6
 In many countries trade liberalization occurred just as capital returned to Latin America. The net inflows pushed up the value of 
the real exchange-rate and encouraged imports, but not exports. This was the problem in Mexico from 1990 to 1994, in 
Argentina after 1991 and Brazil from 1994 to 1998. As a result, export performance in many countries was modest and Latin 
America's increasing share of world exports has mainly been due to Mexico (Bulmer Thomas, 2003:369-70).   
7
 In view of the standard perception of the service sector as being characterised by labour-intensive activities such as hotels, 
restaurants and the retail trade, this may initially seem a rather surprising. But in fact the bulk of investment in service industries 
creates relatively few employment opportunities. Public utilities (e.g. the telecommunications sector), for example, are 
particularly capital intensive. Likewise, financial services are intensive in their use of financial capital and technology. 
8
 See, for instance, Cairncross (1978), who associates Britain’s balance of payments difficulties to the poor performance of British 
manufacturing sector in the post-War period.  
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manufacturing exports.9 And precisely because of their tradability, manufactured goods are open 
to the full-force of international competition, thus making them more likely to innovate. Not 
surprisingly, productivity growth is typically higher in manufacturing than in services (Figure 2).  
 
Table 4  
Latin America Services valued added as % of GDP 
1970-2006 
Averages 
  1970-1979 1980-1990 1991-2001 2002-2006 
Argentina 44.8 52.3 65.6 55.2 
Bolivia 45.2 47.1 52.6 55.8 
Brazil 48.0 45.8 62.3 64.4 
Chile 52.4 53.4 54.5 51.3 
Colombia 45.6 46.8 53.6 54.7 
Costa Rica 60.2 56.1 57.3 62.1 
Dominican 
Republic 50.3 57.2 54.9 59.2 
Ecuador 47.6 47.0 55.8 52.7 
El Salvador   55.3 56.3 59.5 
Guatemala 53.2 54.0 56.2 58.2 
Guyana 41.7 44.2 31.7 42.0 
Honduras 46.9 54.0 49.7 55.4 
Mexico 56.2 57.6 66.4 69.9 
Nicaragua     51.6 53.3 
Panama   73.2 74.0 76.5 
Paraguay 44.0 48.0 56.1 58.6 
Peru 49.7 58.8 61.6 60.1 
Uruguay   53.5 64.7 61.7 
Venezuela, RB 50.7 44.8 46.4 45.0 
Latin America 49.1 52.7 56.4 57.7 
Source: World Development Indicators (2007). World Bank. 
 
                                                 
9
 Technological advances have changed things somewhat, and now many services that were not previously tradeable have become 
so – telephone call centres located in other continents being one example, facilitated by rapidly falling costs in 
telecommunications (itself a service industry).   
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Figure 2: Labour Productivity Growth by Sector, Brazil, Mexico and the USA, 1950-96 
(Average Annual Compound Growth Rates) 
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Source: Mulder (2002:23) 
 
As Mulder (2002:23) points out, however, the view that services have little potential for labour 
productivity increases may be too pessimistic and simplistic, for productivity gains have been 
achieved in several service industries. In this context, in his analysis of productivity trends in the 
US economy, Wolff (2007: 15) provides a useful distinction between the three types of service 
industries. Standardized services like transportation, communications, and utilities can behave 
very much like goods industries in terms of productivity performance. Customized (traditional) 
services, on the other hand, have had much lower productivity growth than goods industries – 
indeed, virtually zero in the post-war period. Finally, Wolff distinguishes a hybrid services sector, 
which are a mix of the first two types. Their productivity performance is lower than that of goods 
industries and standardized services but higher than that of the customized services. In the 
empirical analysis which follows, for data-availability reasons, we are not able to carry out such a 
breakdown, but we do attempt to distinguish between various important sub-sectors within 
services.10  
 
 
                                                 
10
 In Latin America, the debate is much complicated by a large informal sector. Most (though not all) informal sector activities 
would be classified as services. But this risks making the service sector a ‘catch-all’ residual for all activities not classified as 
either industry or primary. According to some Latin American authors (e.g. Hernando de Soto, 1989), the informal sector 
represents an important source of dynamism.  
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3. The Empirical Analysis - Methodological Considerations 
 
Nicholas Kaldor formulated his known growth laws within a developed country context. These 
were initially formulated to explain the slow rate of growth in the United Kingdom (Kaldor, 1966). 
Kaldor’s growth Laws were subject to several critiques which led him eventually to modify his 
position (See, Rowthorn, 1975 and Kaldor, 1975). The first law identifies the manufacturing sector 
as the ‘engine of growth.’ This proposition has been reformulated to take into account other 
sectors than the manufacturing sector such as mining, construction and services (McCombie et. 
al.,2002). The underlying idea is that the manufacturing sector, as well as other sectors, generate 
induced productivity effects within and outside their productive boundaries.  
 
Expressed algebraically,   
(1) qi = c1 + biqgds 
where  
qi = growth of output (gross domestic product); and  
qgds = growth of the ‘growth driving sector’ 
 
The observed relationships are open to criticisms on several grounds. Ordinary least squares 
regression estimates applied to models wherein the alleged independent variable (in Kaldor’s law) 
is not truly independent or predetermined. This is of course inevitably the case when qgds is a sub-
set of qi. Partly in response to such criticisms, a different kind of test has been put forward, and 
that is to regress qi on growth of all other sectors. Specified in this way, there is no overlap of 
dependent and independent variables. In other words,  
 
(2) qi = c1 + b1(qgds – qos)  
 
That is, the rate of growth is a function of the difference between the rate of growth of the driving 
sector (qgds) and that of all other sectors (qos). This is the basic specification that we will use in our 
econometric analysis.  
 
Another methodological weakness of some previous analyses on the validity of Kaldor’s First Law 
is that they fail to compare results in different sectors – focusing on the manufacturing sector, a 
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high R2 and/or large parameter estimate are taken as evidence in favour of the ‘manufacturing 
sector as the engine of growth’ hypothesis. Yet to be in anyway meaningful, such analysis needs to 
be based on comparisons with other sectors. In this paper, where data availability allow, we 
compare the results for manufacturing with those for other sectors (agriculture, mining, services 
and its sub-sectors of finance, transport, retail trade, etc.).  
 
The econometric analysis was carried out on a panel of 18 Latin American countries11, over the 
period 1951-2006, given a potential total number of observations of 1008 (missing data for some 
countries reduced somewhat the actual number of observations). Data was drawn from the ECLAC 
data base. The initial analysis was on the basis of four major sectoral divisions – manufacturing, 
services, mining and agriculture (Table 5). An important issue to be borne in mind in this kind of 
analysis is the poolability of the data. While sharing some basic underlying characteristics, the 
economies of the region display great diversity, both in terms of income per capita, industrial 
structure, and leading economic activities. In order to control for this, all regressions are carried 
out using fixed-effects, on the a priori assumption that the Latin American countries may display 
behavioural differences to the whole population of countries (the implication of using a random 
effects estimator – see Hsiao, 1986:42). Visual inspection alone of the data for country level data 
(Figure 3 and Annex Figures 1-4) show for a majority of the countries in the sample a quite a 
strong relationship between GDP growth and manufacturing and service growth, but far less so for 
the mining and agriculture.   
Table 5: Sectoral Definitions 
    
GMAN manufacturing GCOM retail and wholesale trade, restaurants 
and hotels 
GAGR Agriculture GTRANS Transport, warehousing and 
communications 
GMIN Mining GFIN Financial institutions, insurance, 
real estate and business services 
GSER Services GSOC Public, social and personal services 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Countries included in the analysis were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
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Figure 3: Growth rate of GDP and Manufacturing Output (normalised), 1950-2006 
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Source: Own elaboration, from ECLAC data.  
*The broad policy shift towards WC type policies is represented by the shaded areas.  
 
One further point to be borne in mind is the temporal dimension of the analysis. The dataset used 
in this paper include data from 1950-2006. Structural change over such long periods of time are 
likely to exert a major influence on parameter estimates. In other words, parameters cannot be 
assumed to be constant over such a long-run analysis. To control for this, the analysis here 
includes structural dummies, based on a literature review of the reform dates for the application of 
the NEM (Table 6).12 An autoregressive lag is utilized to control for serial correlation where 
evidence of that is present.  
 
                                                 
12
 None of the dates can of course be considered definitive – and often there is an enormous difference between announcing and 
actually applying reforms. Andrews-Quandt tests (an advanced application of chow-tests for structural breaks) were also tried on 
the whole period. Rarely, however, did the structural breaks identified coincide with the breaks in policies identified in the 
literature review. This is not so surprising – the countries studied often suffered great volatility in their growth rates for reasons 
other than policy reform – the frequency of coup d’etats for example. Structural breaks were also detected in several countries 
during the first and second oil crises. In any case, as a post-hoc method, this method was considered less satisfactory than the ex-
ante rationale of attempting to control for major policy shifts.  
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Table 6: Dates for start of reform period 
    
Argentina 1991 Guatemala 1988 
Bolivia 1985 Honduras 1992 
Brazil 1990 Mexico 1986 
Chile 1975 Nicaragua 1991 
Colombia 1991 Panama 1995 
Costa Rica 1986 Peru 1990 
Dominican Republic 1990 Paraguay 1989 
Ecuador 1992 Uruguay 1978 
El Salvador 1989 Venezuela 1989 
Source: Elaborated from Thorp (1998:228-229), Bulmer Thomas (2003)  
and Cimoli and Correa (2005:52) 
 
a) Results – Static Panel 
The results of the static regressions are shown in Table 7. It is notable that while there is an 
apparently strong relationship between manufacturing growth and total economy-wide output (as 
predicted by Kaldor’s law), there is even a stronger association between service sector growth and 
output. The static results suggest that the highest elasticities are in manufacturing and services 
(0.73 and 0.91 respectively). It is also notable that neither mining nor agricultural sectors seem to 
be highly associated with broader economic growth, with corresponding elasticities of 0.13 and 
0.003 respectively – a finding which to some extent revindicates the structuralist school’s 
predilection to reduce the dependence of Latin American economies on the primary sectors. One 
further observation is that while the dummy variable for policy reform is significantly positive for 
the manufacturing sector, it is negative for both agriculture and mining, suggesting that in these 
cases the reforms diminished still further the weak impact of growth of these sectors on overall 
economic growth (the dummy can be interpreted in the broadest sense as evidence of the reforms 
on spillovers from one sector to the rest).  
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Table 7: Static Panel Results – Major Productive Sectors 
 
  GNOMAN GNOAGR GNOMIN GNOSER 
          
C 1.9834 3.8759 4.1412 0.2002 
  11.2935 14.0799 16.0069 0.8417 
GMAN 0.4081       
  25.4699       
GAGR   0.1756     
    6.8559     
GMIN     0.0017   
      0.7859   
GSER       0.8152 
        23.7499 
DUMMY 0.4939 -0.8055 -0.7211 0.2970 
  1.8880 -1.8773 -1.7406 0.9931 
AR(1) 0.2047 0.3243 0.3256   
  6.3859 10.3380 10.1925   
          
          
Adjusted R-squared 0.46 0.16 0.10 0.39 
Log likelihood -2,355.6 -2,684.7 -2,509.3 -2,517.4 
F-Statistic 271.06 64.12 37.35 282.94 
Durbin-Watson 1.98 1.98 1.97 1.90 
Elasticity* 0.73 0.13 0.003 0.91 
N.Obs  929 929  885  877 
 Sample  1951-2006 1951-2006  1951-2006   1951-2006 
*Elasticities were calculated around the means of the dependent and independent variables. 
 T values are in parenthesis. 
 
One of the problems with the analysis above is that under the label of services sector is the largest 
single group of activities – accounting for between 50-60 per cent of GDP. As a consequence, a 
high correlation between service sector growth and the rest of the economy is hardly surprising.13  
In the following analysis, we breakdown the services sector into several sub-sectors (see Table 5 
again). The results of the regressions on the sub-divisions of the service sector are shown in Table 
8. As was anticipated, for the smaller sub-sectors, the estimated elasticities are somewhat lower 
than for the whole of the service sector. None are higher than that for the manufacturing sector 
(0.73). The weakest impact on overall growth is from public, social and personal services, with an 
elasticity of only 0.15.  
                                                 
13
 Note that this problem is significantly more serious than in the case of manufacturing, which typically is responsible for only 15-
20 percent of GDP in countries in the region.  
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Table 8: Static Panel Results- Service Sector Subdivisions  
  GNOCOM GNOTRANS GNOFIN GNOSOC 
          
C 2.5886 2.8042 2.5517 3.3900 
  16.3021 12.0530 8.5984 11.0903 
GCOM 0.3655       
  22.1370       
GTRANS   0.2091     
    12.0589     
GFIN     0.3019   
      9.3728   
GSOC       0.1633 
        4.6706 
     
DUMMY -0.4868 -0.7772 -0.2030 -0.1864 
  -1.9998 -2.2243 -0.5068 -0.4212 
AR(1)   0.2213 0.2144 0.2352 
    6.6106 5.8162 7.0389 
          
          
Adjusted R-squared 0.3575 0.2281 0.1800 0.0967 
Log likelihood -2,375.4 -2,391.6 -2,219.8 -2,571.8 
F-Statistic 249.1903 85.7058 57.2599 31.6895 
Durbin-Watson 1.80 1.99 1.98 2.01 
Elasticity 0.37 0.31 0.33 0.15 
N.Obs 893  861  770  861  
Sample 1950-2006  1951-2006  1951-2006  1951-2006  
 
b) Dynamic analysis 
 
The relationships between the sectoral and overall rates of growth were further examined through 
the use of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data and the use of state 
space econometric methodology. The choice of technique responded to three types of 
considerations. Dynamic panel data addresses the first two and the state space model simulation 
deals with the third one.  
 
Firstly, the rate of growth may exhibit inertia and as a result should be modelled as dependent on 
its past values. Secondly, the explanatory variable, the sectoral rate of growth, may actually be 
influenced by the rate of growth of the economy, and as a result is also an endogenous variable. To 
control for this phenomenon of reverse causality, the sectoral and overall rate of growth of the 
economy should be determined simultaneously. Finally, it is to be noted that the coefficients 
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computed under standard static techniques can actually vary over time. State space techniques can 
capture the evolution of the coefficient through time. .14.   
 
The dynamic panel technique GMM technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) consists in 
taking the first differences of a model which allows for the existence of a k number of lags of the 
dependent variable. To control for the possible correlation between the dependent variable and the 
error term, Arellano and Bond propose the use of the past value of the dependent variable and of 
the explanatory variables as instruments. Thus the GMM estimator produces unbiased and 
consistent estimates of the regressors as long as the instruments identified are valid instruments. 
To this end the econometric estimation should meet two conditions. First, the error term should not 
be correlated so that the estimates are not biased. Second, the explanatory variables must be 
weakly exogenous (or which is the same thing be valid instruments). Both of these conditions are 
addressed through an AR test and the Sargan test.  
 
In order to throw further light on the relationship between the sectoral and overall rates of growth 
but from a long run perspective, dynamic panel cointegration tests were carried out. Cointegration 
testing within a dynamic panel analysis avoids the difficulties inherent to static cointegration 
analyses as well as the sensitivity problems of time series methods (Kelly and Mavrotas, 2003). 
More importantly these techniques allow for existing heterogeneity in coefficients and dynamics 
across countries which are bound to be present in the Latin American context as different countries 
exhibit markedly different sizes and heterogenous sectoral structures. As in the case with time 
series, testing for cointegration requires that the series in question have the same order of 
integration. In the dynamic panel context, the orders of integration are established through three 
                                                 
14
 Formally, in the general case a state space model representation for an 
 x 1 vector tn y , comprises two 
equations.  
1
(1)  
(2)
t t t t t
t t t t t
y Z c
d T
α ε
α α ν
−
= + +
= + +
 
Where tZ is a conformable matrix, associated to the (mx1) vector of unobserved state variables tα . tT is a matrix of 
parameters; 
 and t td c are vectors that include exogenous and observable variables. The error terms t and tε ν  have 
the usual assumptions. By construction the (mx1) vector of unobserved state variables tα  follows an autoregressive 
process of the first order. The most used algorithm to estimate the parameters of Eqs. (1) and (2) is the Kalman filter.  
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standard tests. These are the Levin and Lin (1993), Im et al. (1997) and Maddala and Wu (1999).15 
The existence of cointegration between qgds and (qgds – qos) are determined on the basis of the 
Larsson et al (1998) test which is based on Johansen´s (1988) procedure.  
 
Table 9: Dynamic Panel – Major Sectors 
  GNOMAN GNOAGR GNOMIN GNOSER 
          
GMAN 0.5144       
  4.7685       
GNONMAN(-1) 0.1564       
  1.3532       
GAGR   0.3122     
    10.8724     
GNOAGR(-1)   0.2589     
    14.6449     
GMIN     0.0101   
      2.6417   
GNOMIN(-1)     0.2482   
      4.5163   
GSER       0.8160 
        106.7390 
GNOSER(-1)       -0.0190 
        -4.5253 
DUMMY 0.9929 -1.3209 -1.3280 -0.6758 
  1.2995 -4.0043 -2.2370 -10.1024 
          
Wald test (ß=0) 22.7 118.2  6.98 11393  
Sargan test-p value  0.44 0.41  0.35  0.58  
Cointegration test  295.4 324.2   265.8 269.14  
         
Elasticity 0.92 0.23 0.02 0.92 
N. obs 911 911 869 841 
Sample 1952-2006 1952-2006 1952-2007 1952-2006 
 
 
The data confirms in all cases the existence of a cointegrating relationship (Table 9), thus 
validating the choice of estimation techniques. The Sargan test indicates the validity of the 
instruments, and the absolute value of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variables is >1 
which indicates that the model is stable. The major change in the parameter estimates is that the 
                                                 
15
 The first assumes that the lagged dependent variable is homogenous across counties. The second allows establishing whether the 
homogeneous lagged dependent variable hypothesis is indeed a valid one. The third has shown to have more robust properties 
and better performance than the first two. In particular it is said to be “robust to statistical choice, lag length in the unit root 
regressions and varying time dimensions fro each cross-sectional unit.” 
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elasticity of manufacturing to total growth is considerably higher than in the static results (0.92 
versus 0.73). The elasticity for the agricultural sector also considerably higher (0.23 versus 0.13), 
though still low in comparison with other sectors.   
 
The analysis at the country level using state space techniques shows that the importance of the 
manufacturing sector to act as the ‘leading’ or ‘motor’ sector of the economy varied widely among 
Latin American economies. Some South American economies such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia 
and Peru show some of the lowest values for the regression coefficient of manufacturing on the 
non-manufacturing sectors of the economy (0.06, 0.13, 0.26 and 0.35 respectfully). Contrarily 
some of the Central American economies (in particular Guatemala), Mexico and Venezuela, show 
the highest degree of interdependence between the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors 
of the economy. The respective coefficients of Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela are 0.76, 0.73 
and 0.7 (See Figure 4).  
Figure 4:  Latin America. Final value of state space coefficient for the regression of 
manufacturing on non-manufacturing sectors of the economy. 1970-2006. 
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Note: All coefficients are significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
Source: Own Elaboration 
The cases of Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia reflect in part on-going processes of 
deindustrialization and partly a growing productive specialization in the non-manufacturing sector 
of the economy due favourable conditions in the production of oil and metals (such as in the case 
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of Ecuador or Bolivia). The evolution over time of their respective coefficients shows a downward 
trend in the cases of Ecuador and Colombia, and stagnant coefficient for Bolivia (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia. Evolution of state space coefficient for the 
regression of manufacturing on non-manufacturing sectors of the economy. 1970-2006. 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
Years
Co
ef
fic
ie
n
ts
 
Ecuador Bolivia Colombia
 
For their part, with the exception of Guatemala, the cases of Central America countries also show 
a process of decline of importance or stagnation in the importance of the manufacturing sector to 
act as the leading sector of overall economic growth. This may be explained by the fact that most 
their manufacturing production takes place within the realm of free trade zones which have weak 
linkages with the rest of the economy (Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6: Guatemala. Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Evolution of state space 
coefficient for the regression of manufacturing on non-manufacturing sectors of the 
economy. 1970-2006. 
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c) Disaggregated analysis of the Services Sector 
 
In view of the evident importance of service sector growth on economy-wide output, the same 
methodology was applied to the data for the sub-sectors of services, with similar results (Table 
10).  
Table 10: Dynamic Panel - Service Sector Subdivisions 
  GNOCOM GNOTRANS GNOFIN GNOSOC 
          
GCOM 0.4366       
  28.6607       
GNOCOM(-1) 0.0473       
  1.4526       
GTRANS   0.3061     
    9.2858     
GNOTRANS(-1)   0.1951     
    5.7028     
GFIN     0.4619   
      127.2774   
GNOFIN(-1)     0.0863   
      16.8995   
GSOC       0.3158 
        4.4175 
GNOSOC(-1)       0.1727 
        10.8110 
     
DUMMY -0.8211 -0.7874 -0.6135 -0.6492 
  -3.6489 -1.3395 -13.8290 -1.8332 
          
Wald test (ß=0) 821.4  86.22  1699.5 19.51  
Sargan test-p value  0.49 0.40  0.54  0.29  
Cointegration test 269.1   341.9 247.5   252.2 
         
Elasticity 0.44 0.45 0.51 0.29 
N. obs 859 844 753 844 
Sample 1952-2004 1952-2005 1952-2006 1952-2006 
 
 
 
The analysis at the country level using state space techniques to determine the importance of the 
disaggregated services sectors reinforces the results produced previously (Table 11). Indeed, the 
estimated elasticities are generally speaking considerably higher than in the case of the dynamic 
panel estimates. There are a wide variety of results according to country, but particularly notable is 
the divergence in results with public, social and personal services sector. Here it has to be borne in 
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mind that we are talking about growth rates of the individual sectors. So differences between 
countries may reflect not only efficiency in public expenditures but also the level of public 
expenditure.   
 
 
Table 11 
Latin America 
Results of commercial, transport, financial and social services 
(1950-2006) 
Countries Final State Space coefficients 
 Commercial Transport Financial SOC 
     
Argentina 0.59(16.9) 0.86(15.50) 0.63 (5.56) 1.56 (7.65) 
Bolivia 0.09(1.56) 0.21 (4.50) 0.12 (1.50) -0.08 (-1.24) 
Brasil …. …. …. …. 
Chile 0.49(8.95) 0.65(12.45) 0.30(3.98) 1.01 (5.72) 
Colombia 0.65(13.33) 0.63(13.34) 0.67(12.13) -0.28 (-2.50) 
Ecuador 0.69(6.58) 0.63(7.38) 0.53(5.64) 0.53 (3.98) 
Paraguay 0.13(1.76) 0.11(1.93) 0.08(0.33) 0.03(0.35) 
Peru 0.40(3.05) 0.43(2.68) 0.40(0.73) 0.83(5.25) 
Uruguay 0.24(4.73) 0.51(8.41) 0.06(0.37) -0.56(-5.5) 
Venezuela 0.49(9.84) 0.56(7.80) 0.66(7.35) 0.59(6.87) 
Costa Rica … … … … 
El Salvador 0.16(2.28) 0.62(12.98) 0.52(3.98) 0.06 (0.58) 
Guatemala 0.42(6.89) -0.10 (-2.64) -0.09 (-1.46) 0.13 (1.61) 
Honduras 0.50(5.86) 0.66(7.46) 0.50(5.59) 0.35(4.83) 
Nicaragua 0.64(11.67) 0.42(5.87) 0.77(8.03) 0.90(8.12) 
Panamá 0.57(8.93) 0.09(2.75) 0.55(6.89) 0.66(5.17) 
Dominican Republic 0.55(12.52) 0.55(11.47) 0.73(5.20) 0.70(5.31) 
México -0.11(-1.99) 0.64(12.70) 0.79(7.59) 1.01(14.16) 
Note: Z-statistics in parenthesis 
 
Acevedo, Mold and Perez 
 26
4. Conclusions 
 
The aims of this paper have been modest – to trace empirical regularities in the patterns of growth 
in Latin America and identify the ‘leading sectors’ over the long run. Although originally 
postulated in the context of the industrial economies, Kaldor’s first growth law provide a useful 
framework for carrying this out. Our country-level analysis shows that there is a surprising amount 
of homogeneity between countries in the estimated growth elasticities. Evidently, there is no pre-
determined path to structural transformation and growth. But the empirical regularities are strong 
enough as to be able to make draw some broad conclusions. At odds with recent research by Wells 
and Thirlwall (2003), who test the applicability of Kaldor’s growth laws for African countries, our 
findings find only mixed evidence in support of Kaldor’s first law in Latin America – that is, that 
manufacturing is the major leading sector of growth.  
 
In the final resort, our estimated elasticities of sectoral growth reflect the degree of articulation of 
an economy – that is, to Hirschman’s well-known phrase, the strength of forward and backward 
linkages between sectors. For the more advanced economies of the region (e.g. Mexico, 
Argentina), the estimated elasticities are generally considerably higher than in the case of the 
poorer countries of the region, such as Honduras or Bolivia. Ongoing research into this question 
hopes to shed more light on these inter-country differences.    
 
Of course, the association between growth of particular sectors and rising income tells us very 
little about the factors causing the rise in income itself. What the analysis does indicate is the 
pattern of resource allocation that normally accompanies a rise in income. As pointed out by 
Chenery (1960), growth is likely to be accelerated by anticipating desirable changes in resource 
use and retarded by institutional arrangements or government policies that inhibit such changes. 
This suggests that, despite the contemporary penchant for dismissing industrial policy out-of-hand, 
in the final resort governments may be ‘doomed to choose’ (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006).16  As 
Hausmann and Rodrik put it,  
 
                                                 
16
 The title of the Rodrik Haussman paper is a play on words of the famous book of Milton Freidman, “Free to Choose”.   
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“Industrial policy conceived as the provision of inputs that are specific to subsets of 
activities is not a choice; it is an imperative. The idea that the government can disengage 
from specific policies and just focus on providing broad-based support to all activities in a 
sector neutral way is an illusion based on the disregard for the specificity and complexity 
of the requisite publicly provided inputs or capabilities.” (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006: 
24).  
 
While the present analysis has focused on the similarities in the pattern of growth, it has also 
revealed the substantial variation that exists and the need to separate particular from universal 
factors. As Chenery (1960:651) concluded a long time ago, an analysis of the part played by 
comparative advantage and other particular factors in a given country must therefore be added to 
knowledge of general growth patterns to arrive at the best allocation of resources.  
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Annex 
Annex Figure 1: Simple Plot of Manufacturing Growth on Economic Growth, 1950-2006 
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Annex Figure 2: Simple Plot of Services Growth and Economic Growth, 1950-2006 
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Annex Figure 3: Simple Plot of Agricultural Growth and Economic Growth, 1950-2006 
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Annex Figure 4: Simple Plot of Mining growth and Economic Growth, 1950-2006 
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Source: Own Elaboration, from ECLAC data 
 
 
 
 
